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Abstract
Society often allocates valuable resources - such as prestigious positions, salaries,
or marriage partners - via tournament-like institutions. In such situations, in-
equality aﬀects incentives to compete and hence has a direct eﬀect on equilibrium
choices and hence material outcomes. We introduce a new distinction between
inequality in initial endowments (e.g. ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of
what one can obtain as rewards (e.g. prestigious positions, money). We show
that these two types of inequality have opposing eﬀects on equilibrium behavior
and wellbeing. Greater inequality of rewards tends to hurt most people — both
the middle class and the poor, — who are forced into greater eﬀort. In contrast,
greater inequality of endowments tends to benefit the middle class. Thus, which
type of inequality is considered hugely aﬀects the correctness of our intuitions
about the implications of inequality.
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1 Introduction
Perhaps there is no other economic debate older than that over inequality. As Sen
(1980) points out, while most have agreed that some form of equality is desirable, there
has been less consensus on what should be equalized. There is even debate over what
is meant by equality and inequality (see Sen (1980), Phelps Brown (1988), Roemer
(1996), Lamont (2003) and many others). Despite this diversity of opinion, typically
equality is treated as a moral question. There may be some distributions of income
or of wealth or some methods of distribution of endowments which are simply unfair.
In contrast, in economics, the second fundamental welfare theorem seemed to separate
these moral issues from the mainstream of economic analysis, the study of eﬃciency.
Only recently it has been suggested that people have “social preferences”, so that they
care directly about what others receive as well as their own income or consumption.
Diﬀering formulations have been proposed by Frank (1985), Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Charness and Rabin (2002) amongst many.
Here, we take a purely economic approach and examine a model where individuals
care only about their own consumption, yet inequality has a material eﬀect on market
outcomes. We assume a society where individuals diﬀer in terms of initial endowments,
whether it is innate ability, education received or inherited wealth. Second, the rewards
that individuals receive as a result of their achievements also vary. A fixed set of
rewards, that could represent cash prizes, places at a prestigious university, attractive
jobs, desirable spouses, social esteem, monopoly rents or any combination of these, is
assigned by a tournament. Individuals, whose endowments are private information,
make a simultaneous decision over eﬀort or performance. Then each individual is given
a reward according to his rank in the distribution of performance: first prize is given
to first place, second prize to second place, and so on.
Such a tournament creates important positional externalities, to obtain a top reward
one must occupy a top position, and by doing so one excludes others from that position
and hence that reward. This induces competitors to behave as though they had a
desire for high rank or status, an observation first due to Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite
(1992), discussed further by Postlewaite (1998). In turn, this leads to equilibrium eﬀort
being ineﬃciently high and equilibrium utility being ineﬃciently low. Crucially, these
externalities also imply that the equilibrium choice of eﬀort and equilibrium utility
depend on both the initial distribution of endowments and the distribution of rewards.
Therefore, there is no need to appeal to any notion of justice for equality to matter. It
matters because what others have aﬀects the job one gets, the wage one is paid and the
amount of leisure one takes.
Thus, both the distribution of endowments and the distribution of rewards aﬀect
individual choices and equilibrium utility. However, we find that changes in the inequal-
ity of endowments have the opposite eﬀect to changes in the inequality of rewards. An
increase in the equality of competitors’ endowments raises the return to eﬀort as it is
easier to overtake one’s rivals. This leads to higher eﬀort for low and middle ranking
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agents. Furthermore, equilibrium utility falls at middle and high ranks and even those
with higher endowments can be worse oﬀ in the more equal and hence more competitive
distribution. However, an increase in the equality of rewards implies there is less diﬀer-
ence between a high prize and a low one. This leads to a reduction in incentives and a
decrease in equilibrium eﬀort for low and middle ranking competitors, and an increase
in their equilibrium utility. Simply put, greater equality of rewards will typically benefit
most of society, greater equality of endowments can harm the majority.
In our analysis, we assume formal equality of opportunity. That is, “there is no
legal bar to access to education, to all positions and jobs, and that all hiring is merito-
cratic” (Roemer, 1996, p. 163) and where individuals are rewarded according to their
productivity (Lamont, 2003). However, the tournament mechanism of resource alloca-
tion allows one to separate the other two forms of inequality — that of endowments and
of rewards. Talent could vary widely, but the most talented could receive a monetary
reward only slightly greater than the least talented. Alternatively, small diﬀerences in
talent could lead to big diﬀerences in outcomes. This distinction between inequality of
endowments and inequality of rewards we believe to be novel.
Why should we assume that success is driven by relative performance? An important
reason is empirical. Tournament-like mechanisms are used in practice to determine uni-
versity admissions, entry into certain professions and promotions and pay within firms.
More generally, there is now a significant body of research that suggests that indicators
of wellbeing such as job satisfaction (Brown et al., (2004)), health (Marmot et al. (1991),
Marmot (2004)) and overall happiness (Easterlin (1974)) are strongly determined by
relative position. That is, a highly ranked individual in a poor country can have greater
health and happiness than a low ranked individual in a richer country, even though the
latter has greater material prosperity. However, this existing literature on relative po-
sition and relative concerns has tended to assume that if relative position matters, this
implies a distaste for inequality. In particular, Frank (1999, 2000) has argued forcefully
that greater inequality exacerbates wasteful social competition. Hopkins and Kornienko
(2004) showed that this argument may be problematic in that, in a model with relative
concerns, an increase in equality of endowments can make everyone worse oﬀ. Here, we
provide partial support for Frank’s argument but we emphasize that it is an increase in
the inequality of rewards, rather than greater inequality of endowments, that worsens
wasteful competition.
We observe that the inequality of rewards has a much better fit with common beliefs
about the eﬀects of inequality. An increase in this type of inequality benefits the rich
in endowments and hurts the middle-class and poor, who are forced into greater eﬀort.
Under some regularity conditions, even stronger welfare eﬀects are possible - namely,
that greater inequality of rewards can make all worse oﬀ. In contrast, greater inequality
of endowments has an opposing eﬀect and can benefit the middle-classes. Of course,
this latter finding is in conflict with common intuitions about the role of inequality.
What these results suggest in practical terms is that policies to promote equality could
have very diﬀerent eﬀects depending on the form of the intervention. For example, an
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attempt to equalize educational achievement, in the sense that it equalizes endowments
of those entering the labor market, would have a quite diﬀerent eﬀect than a policy
to equalize incomes, the rewards from labor market activity. The first policy would
increase competitive pressure on those in the middle of the range of ability, while the
second would reduce it. Thus, once the impact on work eﬀort is included, the first
policy surprisingly could have a negative eﬀect on those it was aimed to help, in a sense
that it would create pressures on those in the middle to perform more, at the expense of
their happiness. In contrast, the second policy would reduce these pressures to perform,
increasing wellbeing for those in the middle at the expense of lower performance.
What is crucial in the tournament model we consider is that the shape and the range
of the distributions of endowments and rewards themselves determine the marginal
return to eﬀort. Consequently, even policy interventions such as lump-sum taxes and
transfers can have an impact on incentives if they change either the distributions of
endowments or rewards. In fact, there are two distinct eﬀects from any changes in the
level of inequality. The first, which we call the direct eﬀect, is simply that under a
more equal distribution of endowments or rewards lower ranked individuals will have
greater endowments or rewards respectively. However, in either case, there is also the
second eﬀect, which we call the incentive or social competitiveness eﬀect. Crucially, the
incentive eﬀect of an increase in equality of endowments is positive and opposite of that
of an increase in the equality of rewards, which decreases incentives. Note that this
incentive eﬀect is created by the competitive externalities present in our tournament
model. So, in their absence such as in more conventional neoclassical models, there are
only the direct eﬀects so that reward and endowment inequality would appear to have
similar results. This may be why the distinction between rewards and endowments has
not been made before.
One important assumption of our tournament model is that there is a fixed dis-
tribution of indivisible rewards. The justification for this is that in reality there are
many desirable things, jobs, places at university, marriage opportunities, that do diﬀer
in quality and which are not divisible. A subtle criticism is that even if rewards are in-
divisible, there might be the possibility of side payments. This possibility is analyzed in
a diﬀerent literature where workers are matched to (indivisible) jobs by an endogenous
wage schedule. For example, Costrell and Loury (2004) and Suen (2007) have consid-
ered changes in the distribution of ability of workers and in the quality of jobs. There is
no incentive eﬀect as there is no choice of eﬀort by workers and all outcomes are Pareto
eﬃcient, in distinct contrast to the situation we model. Nonetheless, the shape of the
distributions of ability and of jobs aﬀects the distribution of wages. That is, inequality
can have a material eﬀect on outcomes even in the presence of side payments. This
suggests that what is crucial is simply that rewards in society vary and that some are
indivisible and thus positional externalities are present.1
1More technically, inequality of endowments and inequality of rewards will have substantial but
opposing eﬀects whether matching between competitors and jobs or rewards is done under transferable
utility or non-transferable utility.
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A further contribution of this paper to the modelling of inequality is its demonstra-
tion of the importance of the method of tracking individuals when changes are made
in the distribution of endowments. There are two ways of doing this: compare choices
and outcomes at a given level of endowment or at a given rank in the distribution of
endowments. As Hopkins and Kornienko (2007) point out and as we show here, the
two methods apparently give diﬀerent results: greater equality of endowments leads to
higher utility at a given low rank, but lower utility at a given low endowment. But
which is the more appropriate comparison? Suppose endowments are intrinsic, for ex-
ample, talent or ability. Then, for example, an individual with some fixed ability level
might observe a change in the distribution of abilities around him as a result of migra-
tion. While her own ability is fixed, her rank in the distribution of abilities changes.
In contrast, if endowments represent something extrinsic such as wealth, for example,
redistribution could change the wealth of many individuals without changing their rel-
ative position or rank. Thus, the nature of the initial heterogeneity in endowments
suggests whether we should analyze distributional changes from the point of view of a
fixed rank or from the point of view of a fixed level of endowment.
The literature on tournaments and contests is extensive. As Konrad (2007) points
out in a survey, increased heterogeneity amongst competitors and decreased spread
of prizes are both known to reduce equilibrium eﬀort in tournaments.2 Our current
contribution to this literature is two-fold: the technical contribution here is to con-
sider very general comparative statics for large populations of competitors, while our
conceptual contribution is to argue that tournaments help us to understand diﬀerent
forms of social inequality. In work that employs similar techniques, Moldovanu and
Sela (2006) consider what would the optimal contest design from the perspective of a
contest designer who aimed to maximize either the expected total eﬀort or the expected
highest eﬀort from contestants. Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2005) generalize this ap-
proach to a two-sided tournament environment similar to the current model. Cole,
Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 1995, 1998) and Fernández and Galí (1999) pioneered
the use of rank-order tournament models to study non-market allocation of resources.
However, their focus of interest is not inequality but a comparison of the eﬃciency of
diﬀerent institutions for assigning rewards. While Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2007)
look at comparative statics arising from changes in the inequality of endowments (with
the latter paper contrasting results using indexing by level and by rank) in perfectly
discriminating rank-order tournaments, neither paper considers reward inequality.
Finally, we argue that our distinction between endowments and rewards diﬀers from
the most common existing concepts of inequality. First, as we argue, inequality of re-
wards and endowments are logically separate from equality of opportunity. Existing
merit-, desert- or eﬀort-based theories of justice assume that those who work more,
or have greater merit, should have greater rewards (see Konow (2003) for a survey).
However, it seems to have been assumed that, with equality of opportunity, individ-
2Much of this literature concentrates on games in which the mechanism that awards prizes is
assumed to be at least partly stochastic. What we model here in a contrast could be called a “perfectly
discriminating rank order tournament”.
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uals will get their “just” reward. That is, there seems to be little discussion of the
fact that the reward schedule could vary even in the presence of equality of opportu-
nity. Second, in the distributive justice literature (see Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981b),
Roemer (1996, 1998) among others) one often encounters the question of equality of
“resources” (wealth, but also possibly education or talent). However, these works make
no distinction about timing or causation, in the sense that there is no distinction made
between what one has initially (endowment) and what one is able to obtain (reward).
Third, equality of rewards should not be confused with equality of welfare or equality
of outcomes. In this model at least, the welfare of an individual depends jointly on a
set of outcomes that includes her endowment, her choice of eﬀort as well as her reward.
We discuss the relation of our work to previous literature on inequality in greater detail
in Section 7.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop our model, where a large population competes in a tournament-
like market to obtain rewards or prizes. We have in mind three prime examples. The
first is students competing for places at college. The second is a market for jobs. For
example, students in the final year of graduate school seek faculty positions at universi-
ties. The third is a marriage market, where singles attempt to attract desirable potential
spouses. These three situations are modelled as tournaments by Fernández and Galí
(1999), Hopkins (2005) and Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) respectively. We will
use the terminology of “contestants” competing for rewards. Contestants have to make
a decision on how to allocate their initial endowment between private consumption and
visible performance that acts as a signal of underlying ability. Each contestant is then
awarded a reward or prize. These are awarded assortatively with the best performer be-
ing awarded the top prize, the median performer the median prize and so on downward
with the worst performer receiving the last prize.
We assume a continuum of contestants. They are diﬀerentiated in quality with a
contestants having diﬀering endowments z with endowments being allocated accord-
ing to the publicly known distribution G(z) on [z, z¯] with z ≥ 0. The level of each
contestant’s endowments is her private information. The distribution G(z) is twice dif-
ferentiable with strictly positive density g(z). A contestant’s level of endowment z has
possible specific interpretations such as her wealth or an ability parameter that deter-
mines maximum potential performance.3 In particular, contestants must divide their
endowments between visible performance x and private consumption or leisure y.
There is also a continuum of prizes or rewards of value s whose publicly known
distribution has the twice diﬀerentiable distribution function H(s) on [s, s¯] and strictly
3For example, suppose all contestants are endowed with the same amount of time that can be used
for production or leisure. Then, let z be productivity per hour and a contestant devoting a proportion
x/z of time to production will have performance x.
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positive density h(s). While the rewards could simply be in cash, this is not necessarily
the case. In the context of the academic job market, s could be interpreted as prestige or
reputation of a university, in the marriage market, s could be a measure of attractiveness
to the opposite sex. After the contestants’ choice of performance, rewards will be
awarded assortatively, so that the contestant with the highest performance x will gain
the prize with highest value s¯. More generally, the rank of the prize awarded will be
equal to a contestant’s rank in terms of performance.
We have two ideas in mind why rewards might be assigned in such a way. First,
such mechanisms are often used in situations such as college admissions to promote a
form of equality of opportunity. For example, if z represents ability and x represents
academic performance, then the highest rewards go to those of the highest performance
which in the equilibrium we consider will be those of highest ability.4 Second, the other
side of the market could consist of people, potential spouses or employers, rather than
inanimate prizes. These potential partners would have to choose between contestants.
But it is easy enough to specify suitable preferences for the partners such that the
end result in equilibrium would be the same: the best performing contestant obtains
the best match.5 Here, we assume that such partners are interested in a contestant’s
performance x mostly in terms of its use as a signal, that is what it reveals about his
underlying endowment of ability z.
A contestant’s endowment z can be employed in performance x or private consump-
tion y = z − x (that is, the rate of conversion between x and y is normalized to one).
The contestants, all have the same utility function
U(x, y, s) = U(x, z − x, s). (1)
We assume that utility is increasing in all three arguments, performance x, private
consumption y and the reward s. That is, there is some private benefit to performance,
for example, private satisfaction from studying.6 While it is possible to divide one’s
endowment between x and y, the only way to obtain a reward s is to take part in the
tournament.
We assume a series of standard conditions on the utility function that will enable
us to derive a monotone equilibrium and clear comparative statics results. (i) U is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable (smoothness); (ii) Ux(x, y, s) > 0, Uy(x, y, s) > 0,
Us(x, y, s) > 0 (monotonicity); (iii) Uxy(x, y, s) > 0, Uys(x, y, s) ≥ 0 and Uxs(x, y, s) ≥ 0
(complementarity); (iv) Uii(x, y, s) ≤ 0 for i = x, y, s (own concavity); (v) Ux(x, z −
x, s)−Uy(x, z− x, s) = 0 has a unique solution x = γ(z, s) and whenever x ≥ γ(z, s) it
holds that Uxs(x, z − x, s) − Uys(x, z − x, s) ≤ 0. This last condition seems somewhat
complicated but it is automatically satisfied if utility is additively or multiplicatively
4Fernández and Galí (1999) show that such mechanisms can be more eﬃcient than markets in
assigning educational opportunities when capital markets are imperfect.
5See Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992, 1998) for explicit consideration of voluntary matching
between contestants and potential partners.
6Nothing substantial depends on this assumption. All results are qualitatively the same if x has no
intrinsic value for contestants.
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separable in s. Note also that it implies a competitor would choose a positive perfor-
mance x even when there are no competitive pressures.
It is natural, perhaps, to think of a competitor’s type as her level of endowment.
However, given an endowment distribution G(z), an agent with endowment z˜ has rank
r˜ = G(z˜) and it is equally valid to think of her type as being r˜ as much as it is z˜. We
have assumed that G(·) is strictly increasing on its support so that there is a one-to-one
relation between endowment and rank. There are several advantages of indexing by
rank over indexing by endowment level as discussed in detail in Hopkins and Kornienko
(2007) and in Section 3 here. Nonetheless, we will use both methods with the analysis
with indexing by level of endowment to be found in Section 5. In this section, we
will treat each competitor’s type as her rank r. Notice that on an agent’s endowment
can be expressed as a function of his rank or z˜ = G−1(r˜) (i.e. z˜ is at the r˜-quantile).
In particular, let us write Z(r) = G−1(r). Equally, her strategy will be a mapping
x(r) : [0, 1]→ R+ from rank to performance.
Then, a symmetric equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium in which all contestants
use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(r) from rank in endowments to
performance. Suppose for the moment that all contestants adopt such a strategy x(r)
that, furthermore, is diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing (we will go on to show that
such an equilibrium exists). Let us aggregate all the performance decisions of the
contestants into a distribution summarized by a distribution function F (x). If x(r) is
strictly increasing, then there will be no mass points in the distribution of performance,
so that F (x) is continuous and strictly increasing. Note that such a strategy is fully
separating. One can deduce a contestant’s endowments z or his rank in the distribution
of endowments r from his choice of performance x.
Prizes will be awarded to contestants in a way that satisfies competitive equality of
opportunity. Specifically, the way in which rewards are awarded should depend only
on an agent’s visible performance, x. In contrast, inequality of opportunity would be
a rule such that the allocation of rewards depends on some further, extraneous factor
such as race, age, gender or social status. While such an allocative rule is perhaps
more realistic, we leave it aside for the future research as it would imply an additional
dimension of inequality among agents, and would call for more advanced methods of
analysis.
Given that rewards are indivisible and are ranked from lowest to highest, the obvious
way to assign rewards in way that would satisfy competitive equality of opportunity
is assortatively: rewards are assigned on the basis of one’s rank F (x) in achievement
with the highest achievement obtaining the highest reward and so on. This assignment
should also be measure-preserving (the equivalent, given a continuum of prizes and
contestants, of awarding exactly one prize to each contestant). A possible way to do
this is to assign rewards assortatively so that rank in rewards equals rank in endowments,
or H(s) = G(z). Note that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium where the strategy x(r) is
strictly increasing in an agent’s rank, we have thatG(z) = F (x) = r. That is, an agent’s
rank r in the distribution of endowments G(z) is equal to her rank in the distribution
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of performance. In turn, if rewards are assigned assortatively according to performance
so that an agent’s rank in the distribution of achievement F (x) is equal to her rank in
the distribution of rewards H(s), so that G(z) = F (x) = H(s) = r. Then we have an
assignment that satisfies equality of opportunity and is measure preserving.7
Remark 1 Competitive equality of opportunity implies that rewards are assigned as-
sortatively based on a competitor’s performance x so that the rank of the reward H(s)
is equal his/her rank in the distribution of performance F (x). In a fully separating
equilibrium, this is equal to his/her rank in endowments so that
G(z) = F (x) = H(s) = r. (2)
That implies that, in such an equilibrium, an agent of rank r is allocated a reward
s = H−1(r).
Note that this relationship (2) implies that we can define the function
S(r) = H−1(r), (3)
which gives the equilibrium reward of a contestant of type r, so that S : [0, 1]→ [s, s¯].
The marginal increase in reward from an increase in one’s rank would be
S0(r) =
1
h(H−1(r)))
=
1
h(S(r))
.
This also implies a reduced form utility:
U(x, y, s) = U(x(r), Z(r)− x(r), S(r))
That is, the tournament with assortative award of prizes implies that each individual’s
payoﬀs are increasing in her rank r in the distribution of contestants. It therefore might
appear to an outside observer that the individual had some form of social preferences
where she cares about her relative position, similar to those analysed by Frank (1985)
and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). As Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992), Postle-
waite (1998) point out, this form of tournament therefore gives a strategic basis to such
models.
Continuing with the assumption that all agents adopt the same increasing, diﬀeren-
tiable strategy x(r), let us see whether any individual agent has an incentive to deviate.
Suppose that instead of following the strategy followed by the others, an agent with
rank r chooses xi = x(r˜), that is, she chooses performance as though she had rank r˜.
Note that her utility would be equal to
U = U(x(r˜), Z(r)− x(r˜)), S(r˜)).
7Notice that our formulation of equality of opportunity is consistent with Roemer (1996, 1998), as
here all individuals of the same type - defined by the individual’s endowment - submit the same eﬀort
(so that the distribution of eﬀort within their own type is degenerate) and get the same reward.
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We diﬀerentiate this with respect to r˜. Then, given that in a symmetric equilibrium,
the agent uses the equilibrium strategy and so r˜ = r, this gives the first order condition,
x0(r) (Ux(x, Z(r)− x, S(r))− Uy(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))) + Us(x, Z(r)− x, S(r))S0(r) = 0.
(4)
This first order condition balances disutility from increasing eﬀort x against the implied
marginal benefit in terms of an increased reward from doing so. It defines a diﬀerential
equation,
x0(r) =
Us(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))
Uy(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))− Ux(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))
S0(r) = φ(x, Z(r), S(r))S0(r).
(5)
An important point to recognize is that this diﬀerential equation and the equilibrium
strategy, which is its solution, both depend on the distribution of endowments through
Z(r) = G−1(r) and the distribution of rewards through S(r) = H−1(r).
Our next step is to specify what Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)
call the “cooperative choice”, which is the optimal consumption choice (xc(r), yc(r))
when an individual does not or cannot aﬀect her reward. Specifically, assume that an
agent of rank r is simply assigned a reward S(r) rather than having to compete for it.
Her optimal choice in these circumstances must satisfy the standard marginal condition
Ux(x,Z(r)− x, S(r))− Uy(x, Z(r)− x, S(r)) = 0. (6)
By assumption (v) above, there is a solution xc(r) = γ(Z(r), S(r)) to this maximization
problem. The cooperative strategy also enables us to fix the appropriate boundary
condition for the diﬀerential equation (5). Thus, the initial condition, or the choice of
the individual with the lowest rank zero is,
x(0) = xc(0) . (7)
We can now show the following existence result. It shows that there is only one
fully separating equilibrium. Specifically, if all contestants adopt a strategy x(r) that
is the solution to the above diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary condition (7) and
rewards are awarded assortatively according to the rule (2), then no contestant has an
incentive to deviate. Further, as this solution x(r) is necessarily strictly increasing, it
is fully separating with contestants with high endowments producing a high level of
performance. Thus, an authority organizing the tournament to promote equality of
opportunity would be rational to give high rewards to high performers as high perfor-
mance signifies high ability. Or, in the matching story, potential partners should prefer
to match with high performers. Note, however, this will typically not be the only equi-
librium. As is common in signalling models, other equilibria such as pooling equilibria
will exist. In this paper, we concentrate on the separating equilibrium as this seems the
most natural for the settings we consider.
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Proposition 1 The diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary conditions (7) has a unique
solution which is the only symmetric separating equilibrium of the tournament. Equi-
librium performance x(r) is greater than cooperative amount, that is x(r) > xc(r) on
(0, 1].
This implies that the cooperative outcome xc(r) Pareto dominates the equilibrium
performance x(r) from the point of view of the contestants. As is common in competitive
situations, the contestants could make themselves all better oﬀ by agreeing to work less.
How much more will depends on the exact form of the equilibrium strategy x(r) which
in turn depends on the distribution of endowments and the distribution of rewards. We
will go on to look at how equilibrium choices and welfare change in response to changes
in these distributions.
Note that this welfare result holds even though contestants derive utility from their
own performance, that is, it not a pure signal. However, if other parties, for exam-
ple, partners or employers, also benefit from the competitors’ eﬀorts, overall welfare
judgements are potentially more complicated. Hopkins (2005) looks at this issue and
finds that in the presence of incomplete information, the level of performance can be
excessive even considering the welfare of employers. However, it is clearly true that if
their performance is suﬃciently valuable to society, then the equilibrium performance
level could be excessively low relative to the social optimum even if it too high from
the perspective of the competitors. Another possibility is that, like in Cole, Mailath
and Postlewaite’s (1992) original tournament model, the beneficiaries are the next gen-
eration. In this case, social competition leads to a growth rate that is higher than the
present generation would choose (see also Corneo and Jeanne (1997)).
3 Two Eﬀects of Changes in Equality
Since, to our knowledge, the eﬀects of the distributions of endowments and rewards
in rank-based tournaments have been little explored, in this section we introduce the
intuition behind our analysis of how changes in either the distribution of endowments
or in the distribution of rewards aﬀect individuals. We make the point that in both
cases a change influences individual welfare through two channels, a direct eﬀect and
an incentive eﬀect. It is the second eﬀect which is unique to our tournament model
in that here, in contrast to standard models, changes in the endowment or rewards of
others will change the incentives of individuals to engage in eﬀort. But even the direct
eﬀect is not straightforward as whether it is positive or negative can depend on the
way it is viewed, whether from a position of a constant endowment or from a constant
rank. These diﬀering eﬀects we now try to make clear in a simple way before moving
to formal results in the next section.
Consider first a situation where individuals diﬀer in their natural endowments, such
as talent, ability, physical attractiveness, and so on. Then, while the distribution of
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endowments may change, through immigration for example, the endowment of an indi-
vidual will stay the same. However, if the distribution does change, then typically the
rank of such an individual will change even if her endowment does not. In such case,
it makes sense to fix an individual by the level of her endowment z, and consider what
happens as her rank r changes in response to changes in the distribution.
Consider instead a situation where individual endowments are in terms of income,
wealth, capital goods, and so on. In this case, an individual’s endowment is not intrin-
sic and could be changed. For example, a redistributive tax policy could change the
endowments of most (if not all) individuals. In such situations, it is common among
policy analysts to analyze policy consequences at diﬀerent ranks - for example, for the
median individual or for lower and upper quartiles. Eﬀectively in such analysis, one
fixes an individual by her rank in the distribution of endowments r, but allows for her
endowment z to change as the distribution of endowments varies.8
In other words, diﬀerent forms of endowments call for diﬀerent methods of analysis
- one that holds constant an individual’s endowment z, and another that fixes an indi-
vidual’s rank r. Notice that given our assumption of strictly increasing and continuous
distribution of endowments G(z), one’s endowment and one’s rank have a one-to-one
correspondence. The two methods, however, diﬀer in their analytical properties. We
find the rank method to be easier. It allows less restrictive comparative statics analy-
sis as one does not have to maintain the same support of the distribution of either
rewards or endowments. However, it requires the use of stochastic orders which work
in terms of rank rather then in terms of levels but which are not well known - namely
the dispersion order and the star order (both of these orders are presented in Appendix
A). In contrast, the endowment method is more diﬃcult analytically, but it requires
better known stochastic orders - such as refinements of standard first- and second-order
stochastic dominance.
The distinction among rank-indexing and level-indexing is very important for the
understanding of the eﬀects of changes in inequality. Not only do the two indexing
methods require diﬀerent comparative statics methods, they also diﬀer in how change
in inequality is channelled into individual choices and well-being, as we will now see.9
In what follows we assume that there is a change in either the distributions of
endowments or in the distributions of rewards, but not both. That is, we do not change
both distributions at once. We label the initial distribution a for ex ante and the
changed distribution p for ex post. We will consider two regimes. In regime G, we
assume that the societies have identical distributions of rewards Ha = Hp = H but
diﬀer in the distribution of endowments Ga 6= Gp. In regime H, we assume that the
8When redistributive policies are rank-preserving (such as a policy combining a lump-sum transfer
and a proportional tax), analysis at a fixed rank is equivalent doing analysis for a given individual
before and after the change.
9The same issues arise in assignment models. For example, Costrell and Loury (2004) use what we
call rank indexing and Suen (2007) uses level indexing for comparative statics and obtain apparently
diﬀerent results.
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societies have identical distributions of endowments, that is Ga = Gp = G, but diﬀer in
the distributions of rewards, i.e. Ha 6= Hp.
We go on to show how, given equality of opportunity, changes in the inequality
of endowments and rewards aﬀect diﬀerent individuals. We distinguish between two
diﬀerent consequences of changes in the level of inequality, which we call the direct
eﬀect and the incentive eﬀect.
3.1 The Direct Eﬀect
The direct eﬀect simply arises because changes in the social or economic environment
of an individual have direct consequences on that individual’s choices and well-being -
as they will change her endowment z, or her rank r, and/or her reward s - these direct
consequences will vary with the indexing method.
Notice first that diﬀerent endowment distributions imply that almost all individuals
with fixed rank r have diﬀerent endowments in the two societies, i.e. Za = G−1a (r) 6=
G−1p (r) = Zp - even though their equilibrium reward S = H
−1(r) does not change (see
Figure 1). In contrast, almost all individuals with fixed endowment z have diﬀerent
ranks in the two societies, i.e. ra = Ga(z) 6= Gp(z) = rp, and thus diﬀerent equilibrium
rewards Sa = H−1(Ga(z)) 6= H−1(Gp(z)) = Sp (see Figure 2).
An easy way to understand the diﬀerences between the two perspectives is to com-
pare Figures 1 and 2, which show similar changes in the distribution of endowments. In
both cases, the ex post distribution Gp is more equal than the original distribution Ga.
As illustrated in Figure 2, for a fixed level of endowments z1, in the more equal distri-
bution of endowments a low ranked agent will have a lower reward. That is, the direct
eﬀect of redistribution is negative for low-ranked agents under indexing by endowment
levels. However, in Figure 1, it is shown that for a fixed rank r1 a low ranked agent will
have the same reward but a higher level of endowments in a more equal distribution of
rewards, the direct eﬀect of redistribution for the low ranked is positive. Comparisons
at a fixed level of endowment or at a fixed rank give a very diﬀerent view of the same
phenomenon.
In contrast, when we change the distribution of rewards, the direct eﬀect does not
depend on whether we index by rank or by level. The eﬀect of redistribution of rewards
will be positive for the low ranked. For example, see Figure 3 where now the ex post
distribution of rewards Hp is more equal than the ex ante distribution Ha(s). We have
Sa = H−1a (r1) = H
−1
a (G(z1)) < H
−1
p (r1) = H
−1
p (G(z1)) = Sp. One can also see that it
will be negative for the high-ranked.
Remark 2 The direct eﬀect of greater equality can be summarized as follows.
(i) Consider first rank-indexing. Suppose endowments become more equal, then,
in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents have higher (lower) endowments. Suppose,
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endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
Za(r1) Zp(r1)ss¯
H(s) 1
S(r1)
r1
rˆ
Ga
Gp
Figure 1: The direct eﬀect in Regime G - under rank-indexing: a contestant with low
rank r1 has a higher endowment Zp(r1) under the more equal distribution of endowments
Gp than the endowment Za(r1) under the less equal distribution of endowments Ga, and
in both cases has a reward S(r1).
instead, rewards become more equal, then, in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents
also have higher (lower) rewards.
(ii) Consider now level-indexing. Suppose endowments become more equal, then,
in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents have lower (higher) endowments. Suppose,
instead, rewards become more equal, then, in equilibrium, low (high) ranking agents, in
contrast, have higher (lower) rewards.
Note that the direct eﬀect is what one would obtain under classical assumptions. To
see this, suppose rewards were assigned non-competitively by a social planner according
to one’s rank in the endowment distribution, i.e. H(s) = G(z). Then choices would be
made made non-competitively, corresponding to the “cooperative” choices as set out in
Section 2. The direct eﬀect of changes in distributions on individual choices and welfare
will thus be a consequence of a direct response to changes in agent’s endowment z or
in her reward s. Furthermore, if we use the rank indexing, the direct eﬀect of greater
equality of rewards is qualitatively similar to greater equality of endowments. Very
simply, it benefits the low ranked at the cost of the high ranked which is not surprising.
However, this makes the point that under classical assumptions (that is, without posi-
tional or competitive externalities in choices), equality of rewards and endowments are
indistinguishable, which may explain why this distinction has not been made before.
Though, note that even here, the direct eﬀects are not the same under level indexing.
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endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
z zˆ z¯z1
H(s) 1
Sa(z1) Sp(z1)
Gp Ga
Figure 2: The direct eﬀect in Regime G - under level-indexing: a contestant with fixed
low endowment z1 has a reward Sp(z1) under the more equal distribution of endowments
Gp that is worse than the reward Sa(z1) under the less equal distribution of endowments
Ga.
3.2 The Incentive Eﬀect
Now let us turn to the incentive (or marginal, positional, strategic, or social compet-
itiveness) eﬀect of changes in inequality. Importantly, the eﬀect of less dispersion in
rewards and endowments have an opposite incentive eﬀect regardless of the indexing
method used. The incentive eﬀect is the result of agents’ strategic interactions. As
was shown in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2007), in the non-cooperative game where
agent’s rank matters for her welfare, the “social density”, or “social competitiveness”,
is important as it changes incentives. The incentive eﬀect of changes in distributions
on individual choices and welfare will depends largely on the densities (or marginal
frequencies) of endowments and rewards, g(z) and h(s). This incentive eﬀect can be
modelled using the dispersion order (presented in Appendix A) which is a stochastic
order used to compare distributions in terms of their densities.
Remark 3 The incentive eﬀect of greater equality can be summarized as follows.
(i) Suppose endowments become less dispersed, then there is an increase in the mar-
ginal return to eﬀort, as it is now easier to surpass neighbors, so that agents tend to
increase their eﬀort.
(ii) Suppose rewards become less dispersed, then there is a decrease in the marginal
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endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
Hp
Ha
z z¯z1
r1
ss¯
1
Sa(r1)Sp(r1)
G(z)
Figure 3: The direct eﬀect in Regime H - under rank- and level-indexing: a contestant
with low rank r1 has higher reward Sp(r1) under the more equal distribution of rewards
Hp than reward Sa(r1) under the less equal distribution of rewards Sa.
return to eﬀort as rewards are now more similar, so that agents tend to decrease their
eﬀort.
To find the total eﬀect, which includes both direct and incentive eﬀects, one needs
to analyze how changes in inequality aﬀects behavior, which we turn to now.
4 Eﬀects of Changing Inequality Under Indexing
By Rank
We will now consider the eﬀect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in the
distribution of endowments G(z) and changes in the distribution of rewards H(s). In
this section, we do this by comparing behavior before and after the change at each rank
in the distribution of endowments, using the rank indexing methodology as discussed
in Section 3. We saw in Section 2 that equilibrium behavior depends on the reward
function S which is jointly determined by G and H. Thus, as the distribution of
endowments G or the distribution of rewards H (or both) change, so does the reward
function S. Thus, a change in either distribution of endowments or rewards (or both)
translates into a change in equilibrium choice of performance x(r) and, thus, into a
change in individual welfare. We have just seen in the previous section in intuition as
15
to why changes in the level of equality of endowments and rewards can have diﬀerent
eﬀects.
Equilibrium utility in terms of rank will be U(r) = U(x(r), Z(r) − x(r), S(r)). By
the envelope theorem we have
U 0(r) =
Uy(x(r), Z(r)− x(r), S(r))
g(Z(r))
(8)
We are interested in what eﬀect a change in the level of inequality would have on
equilibrium utility and hence individual welfare. Note though that as average utility isR
U(r)dr, if individual welfare U(r) rises at every rank then social welfare will surely
rise.
In what follows we assume that there is a change in either the distributions of
endowments or in the distributions of rewards, but not both. That is, we do not change
both distributions at once. We label the initial distribution a for ex ante and the
changed distribution p for ex post. We will consider two regimes - one focusing on the
eﬀects of changes in distribution of endowments (Regime G) and the one focusing on
the eﬀects of changes in distribution of rewards (Regime H). In doing this, we make use
of the dispersion order, which as the name suggests, is a way of ordering distributions in
terms of their dispersion. Please see Appendix A for details. Our results with respect
to inequality of endowments are a generalization of those in Hopkins and Kornienko
(2007), who examine a similar problem with a less general specification of utility but
who do not consider reward inequality.
4.1 Change in Endowments (Regime G)
We investigate in this section the eﬀects of changes in the distribution of endowments
on equilibrium performance decisions and equilibrium utility. In particular, we find that
an increase in the equality of endowments can have adverse eﬀects. This is because as
peoples’ endowments become closer together, it is easier to overtake one’s neighbors.
This leads to a general increase in social competition. While redistribution can ben-
efit those who receive higher endowments, even some of these will be worse oﬀ as a
consequence of greater competition.
In regime G, we assume that the societies have identical distributions of rewards,
i.e. Ha = Hp = H, but diﬀer in the distributions of endowments, i.e. Ga 6= Gp and in
fact are distinct, that is, equal at only a finite number of points. Diﬀerent endowments
imply that the two societies have diﬀerent endowment functions, i.e. Za = G−1a (r) and
Zp = G−1a (r).
Our first result is to show that if a range of contestants receive an increase in
endowments, they will respond with higher performance.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that endowments are higher ex post so that Zp(r) ≥ Za(r)
on an interval [0, rˆ] where rˆ is the point of first crossing of Zp(r) and Za(r). Then
xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and ex post performance is higher on that interval: xp(r) > xa(r) on
(0, rˆ].
A consequence of this is that if the new distribution of endowments Gp stochasti-
cally dominates the old, then performance will be higher for all agents. Note that if
Gp stochastically dominates Ga then by definition Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z) for all z, which in
turn implies that Zp(r) ≥ Za(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. That is, in a richer society where
endowments are higher for every agent, performance is higher for all.
Corollary 1 Suppose that endowments are stochastically higher ex post so that Zp(r) ≥
Za(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1], then performance rises almost everywhere: xp(r) > xa(r) on
(0, 1].
We can now give a suﬃcient condition for equilibrium utility to rise for all agents and
hence for an increase in social welfare. The condition has two parts. First, endowments
must be more dispersed in the sense of the dispersion order or Gp ≥d Ga (see Appendix
A for the definition and properties of this and subsequently used stochastic orders).
Second, the lowest ranked agent must be no worse oﬀ or Zp(0) ≥ Za(0). The point is
that, as utility both depends on endowments and the degree of social competition, one
can guarantee an increase in endowments will lead to an increase in utility if at the
same time the social density does not rise.
Proposition 3 Suppose endowments are more dispersed ex post Gp ≥d Ga and mini-
mum endowments no lower Zp(0) ≥ Za(0), then utility is higher ex post almost every-
where: Up(r) > Ua(r) on (0, 1].
Our final result in this subsection concerns an increase in equality. As remarked,
there are two resulting eﬀects. Figure 1 illustrates the direct eﬀect: with a more equal
distribution of endowments, the low ranked have higher endowments ex post. However,
as we have argued, the marginal eﬀect works toward greater competition. As people are
closer together, it is easier to overtake one’s neighbors. For the low ranked, the direct
eﬀect dominates. For the middle class, the marginal eﬀect is more important, whereas
for the upper classes, they lose both from redistribution and from greater competition.
We thus find that the middle and upper classes are worse oﬀ. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.
Specifically, we suppose the distribution of endowments becomes less dispersed in
terms of the dispersion order. Furthermore, the lowest ranked agent has more endow-
ments, or Zp(0) > Za(0), and the highest ranked has less Zp(1) < Za(1). Thus, in a
clear sense the distribution Gp of endowments is more equal than distribution Ga.
17
rank
performance
rank
endowments
rank
utility
00rˆ0 1 rˆ rˆ
Up
Ua
xp xa
Za
Zp
Figure 4: Greater equality of endowments: typical comparative statics when ex post
endowments Zp are more equal than ex ante Za (indexing by rank). Performance rises
at lower and middle ranks; but utility falls at middle and upper ranks.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the minimum level of endowments is higher ex post
Zp(0) > Za(0) (9)
and endowments are less dispersed ex post
gp(Zp(r)) ≥ ga(Za(r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ga ≥d Gp (10)
and also suppose that the maximum level of endowments is lower ex post
Zp(1) < Za(1) (11)
Then, performance is higher ex post for the bottom and middle: xp(r) > xa(r) on [0, rˆ]
where rˆ is the only point of crossing of Za(r) and Zp(r). Second, utility rises at the
bottom, Up(0) > Ua(0), but utility is lower ex post for the middle and top, Up(r) < Ua(r)
for all r ∈ [rˆ, 1].
Note that this result implies that there are middle ranking agents who are worse oﬀ
even though they have higher endowments ex post (again see Figure 4 for the outcomes
for individuals just to the left of rˆ). However, the eﬀect at the relatively low ranked
individuals, i.e. those with r ∈ (0, rˆ) is, in general, ambiguous.
4.2 Changes in Rewards (Regime H)
In this subsection, we find that the eﬀects of changes in rewards are quite diﬀerent from
those arising from changes in endowments. The first point is that the eﬀect of greater
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equality in rewards has the opposite marginal eﬀect to greater equality in endowments.
Greater equality of rewards implies that the marginal return to greater eﬀort is relatively
low, and will tend to reduce competition. This will tend to make competitors better oﬀ.
However, for high ranking competitors who expect high rewards, the eﬀect is ambiguous.
In a more equal society they work less hard but obtain lower rewards.
In regime H, we assume that the societies have identical distributions of endow-
ments, i.e. Ga = Gp = G, but diﬀer in the distributions of rewards, i.e. Ha 6= Hp
and in fact are distinct, that is, equal at only a finite number of points.. Again, dif-
ferent rewards imply that the two societies have also diﬀerent reward functions, i.e.
Sa(r) = H−1a (r) and Sp(r) = H
−1
p (r).
Our first result concerns suﬃcient conditions for greater eﬀort by all competitors.
We find that if rewards are lower at every rank and the rewards are more dispersed,
then the environment is definitely more competitive and eﬀort rises at every rank.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the rewards are more dispersed ex post
S0p(r) ≥ S0a(r) on (0, 1)⇔ hp(Sp(r)) ≤ ha(Sa(r)) on (0, 1)⇔ Hp ≥d Ha (12)
and that the minimum reward is lower ex post
Sp(0) < Sa(0) (13)
and then performance is higher ex post so that xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ] where rˆ is the
first crossing point of Sp(r) and Sa(r).
This leads to the following corollary. If rewards are more unequal and lower at every
rank, then performance increases for every agent.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the ex-post rewards are more dispersed and also are stochas-
tically lower, i.e. Hp ≥d Ha and Sp(r) ≤ Sa(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1], then performance rises
almost everywhere: xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1].
Note that if one makes stronger assumptions on the utility function, one can still
obtain an increase in performance at all ranks without the stochastic dominance as-
sumption of Corollary 2. First we look if utility is additively separable in rewards.
Proposition 6 Assume utility is additively separable in rewards, that is U = V (x, y)+s
for some function V such that conditions (i) to (v) on U are still satisfied, then if
Hp ≥d Ha, it follows that xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, 1].
We can obtain a similar result if utility is multiplicatively separable in rewards. We
use the star order that is defined and discussed in detail in Appendix A. But, more
informally, the star order implies that Hp is more dispersed or stochastically lower than
Ha but not necessarily both as we assume in Corollary 2.
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Figure 5: Greater equality of rewards: typical comparative statics when ex post rewards
Sp are more equal than ex ante Sa (indexing by rank). Performance falls and utility
rises at low and middle ranks.
Proposition 7 If rewards are multiplicatively separable or U = V (x, y)s for some func-
tion V such that conditions (i) to (v) on U are still satisfied, then if Hp ≥∗ Ha, Hp
is more dispersed in the star order, it follows that xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on
[0, 1].
We next identify a suﬃcient condition for an increase in equilibrium utility at every
rank. This is much simpler than when considering changes in the distribution of en-
dowments. Here, we simply require that the new distribution Hp stochastically domi-
nates the old Ha and that the lowest reward Sp(0) is strictly higher. This implies that
Sp(r) ≥ Sa(r) for all r, or rewards are higher at every rank. As this will also decrease
the incentives to compete, it is not surprising that equilibrium utility rises.
Proposition 8 If the minimum reward is higher ex post Sp(0) > Sa(0) and rewards
are everywhere else no lower, Sp(r) ≥ Sa(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1], then utility is everywhere
higher ex post: Up(r) > Ua(r) on [0, 1].
We turn to inequality. As illustrated in Figure 3, the direct eﬀect of greater equality
in rewards benefits the low-ranked simply because their rewards will typically be higher.
However, we can identify another eﬀect. The compression of rewards will decrease the
marginal incentive to compete and performance will fall. This will further benefit
competitors. Thus, as we see in Figure 5, utility will rise even for agent with rank rˆ
whose reward is unchanged.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the lowest reward is higher ex post
Sp(0) > Sa(0) (14)
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and also rewards are less dispersed ex post
S0p(r) ≤ S0a(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1)⇔ Ha ≥d Hp (15)
and also suppose that the highest reward is lower ex post
Sp(1) < Sa(1). (16)
Then performance is lower ex post xp(r) < xa(r) on (0, rˆ] where rˆ is the only point of
crossing of Sa(r) and Sp(r). Second, utility is higher on that interval: Up(r) > Ua(r)
for all r ∈ [0, rˆ].
We have already seen, Propositions 6 and 7, that in some special cases, greater
dispersion of rewards is suﬃcient to make performance rise for all competitors. We give
an example of this, which has another interesting property.
Example 1 Suppose U(x, y, s) = xαys for some α < 1, so rewards are multiplicatively
separable. Assume that endowments are uniform on [1,2]. Then if, for example, rewards
go from being uniform on [0.5,2.5] (Ha = 0.5s−0.25 or Sa = 2r+0.5) to being uniform
on [1,2] (Hp = s − 1 or Sp = r + 1) then by Proposition 7, performance must fall
almost everywhere as these two distributions satisfy Hp ≤∗ Ha, the ex post distribution
is less dispersed in terms of the star order (and, also, the dispersion order). Note that
the lowest competitor would have a higher utility under the ex post distribution, i.e.
Up(0) > Ua(0), as she has a higher reward (but the same endowment). Indeed, everyone
with rank up to 0.5 must be better oﬀ by Proposition 9 as here the crossing point of Sa
and Sp is 0.5. But, further, here U 0(r) = xα(r)Z 0(r)S(r). If α is reasonably low so that
the influence of the lower performance ex post is not large, the slope of utility in rank
will not be very diﬀerent ex post. Thus, for example, for α < 0.35, everyone will be
better oﬀ under the less dispersed distribution Hp.
That is, it is possible by making rewards less dispersed to reduce total performance
but make a Pareto improvement. Everyone will be happier because everyone works
less. This raises the question as to whether it would be possible to make everyone
better oﬀ by altering the level of inequality of endowments. However, while a greater
dispersion of endowments by Proposition 4 reduces performance for most (and possibly
all) competitors, it cannot make all better oﬀ for a fixed mean endowment. This is
because the greater dispersion would lower the utility of a low ranked competitors, as
they would have a lower endowment in the more dispersed distribution.
5 Results under Indexing by Level of Endowment
We now consider a situation where the endowment is intrinsic to the agent, for example,
talent. We, therefore, use the level-indexing method and compare an agent’s utility
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before and after changes in the level of inequality given this fixed level of endowment.
As this method has been used before, for example by Hopkins and Kornienko (2004)
and Hopkins (2005)), it thus requires less extensive coverage. We find an apparently
diﬀerent outcome from that under rank indexing as those with low endowments are
now worse oﬀ under greater equality of endowments. The reason for this is that, as
discussed in Section 3, the direct eﬀect of greater equality on an individual on a fixed
low level of endowments is negative, as opposed to positive under rank indexing.
We now look at the tournament from the perspective of indexing by levels of endow-
ments. That is, we consider the model introduced in Section 2 in terms of endowments
z not rank r. As before a continuum of contestants choose x to maximize utility (1).
Given the assortative assignment of rewards (2), we can now write the equilibrium re-
ward as a function of endowment as S(z) = H−1(G(z)). We look for a strictly increasing
symmetric equilibrium strategy as a function of endowments. The equilibrium strategy
x(z) will be a solution to the following diﬀerential equation, compare equation (5),
dx(z)
dz
=
Us(x, z − x, S(z))g(z)
Uy(x, z − x, S(z)− Ux(x, z − x, S(z))h(S(z))
=
dx(r)
dr
dr
dz
=
dx(r)
dr
g(z). (17)
The boundary condition will be x(z) = xc(G(z)), that is the same as in rank terms
(7). The only separating equilibrium in terms of endowments x(z) will be a solution to
the above equation. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Working in terms
of endowments or ranks does not change the underlying game or its equilibria. We
emphasize that they are just diﬀerent ways of looking at the same behavior.
We will also look at individual welfare in terms of endowments. Define U(z) =
U(x(z), z − x(z), S(z)), that is U(z) is equilibrium utility in terms of endowments z.
We show that an increase in equality of endowments amongst competitors reduces the
utility of the weakest competitors. In contrast, a similar decrease in the dispersion of
the rewards has an opposite eﬀect. In contrast to our work using rank-indexing, we
assume here that Ga and Gp have the same support [z, z¯] and that similarly there is a
common support [s, s¯] for the distributions of rewards Ha and Hp. Here we use second
order stochastic dominance to order distributions in terms of dispersion (see Appendix
A for the relationship among diﬀerent stochastic orders).
Proposition 10 Let Ua(z) and Up(z) be the equilibrium utilities in terms of endow-
ments ex ante and ex post respectively.
(i) Suppose that Gp second order stochastically dominates Ga. Denote the first cross-
ing of Ga(z) and Gp(z) as zˆ. Then, utility falls for the bottom and middle Up(z) ≤ Ua(z)
for all z ∈ [z, zˆ].
(ii) Suppose that Hp second order stochastically dominates Ha. Denote the first
crossing of Ha(s) and Hp(s) as sˆ, and denote zˆ = S−1(sˆ) = G−1(Hp(sˆ)) = G−1(Ha(sˆ)).
Then, utility rises for the bottom and middle Up(z) ≥ Ua(z) for all z ∈ [z, zˆ].
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Figure 6: Greater equality of endowments: typical comparative statics when the ex
post distribution of endowments Gp is more equal than ex ante Ga (indexing by levels).
Utility falls at low and middle levels of endowments.
That is, for those with relatively low endowments, that is, for those whose endow-
ment is less than zˆ (see Figure 6), a more equal distribution of endowments leads to
lower individual welfare, while, conversely, a similar decrease in inequality of rewards
results in an increase in individual welfare. This is because, as discussed in Section 3,
the direct eﬀect of greater equality on an individual on a fixed low level of endowments is
negative, in that she will now have a lower reward (again see Figure 2). This is because
with the reduction in inequality there are more contestants with middling endowments
who will now take the middling rewards. Contestants with a fixed low endowment will
now receive a lower reward. The incentive to compete is also increased by the greater
social density and so even those in the middle will be worse oﬀ as they compete harder.
Conversely, the direct eﬀect of more equal rewards is positive and incentives to compete
are reduced.
6 Summary of the Results
The main question of our paper is as follows. Suppose individuals diﬀer only in their
starting endowments (ability, wealth). Suppose individuals compete with others for
rewards (college places, jobs, marriage partners, political rents) by taking a visible
action (make an eﬀort, produce output). Suppose rewards to success are allocated via
a tournament. Suppose competitive equality of opportunity holds - so that rewards
are assigned according to the action, i.e. only relative performance determines relative
success - that is, there is no discrimination by race, gender, age, etc. Suppose further
that individuals have access to the same technology and have the same taste over the
actions they take and rewards they receive. Suppose individual endowments do not
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aﬀect an individual’s ability to participate in the tournament. Suppose distributions
of endowments and rewards are exogenous and independent of each other, and that
aggregate actions do not change aggregate rewards and have no social value. Is a
particular individual happier when endowments are more equal, or when rewards are
more equal?
To answer this question, we first note that, for two types of inequality, the results
can be opposite. However, the precise way how these two types of inequality aﬀect
a particular individual depends on the individual’s starting position. Moreover, it is
greater (in)equality of rewards, not of endowments, that has the conventional properties
of (in)equality. We summarize these as follows.
Remark 4 For most individuals, change in the equality of endowments has qualitatively
opposite eﬀects to a change in the equality of rewards.
(i) Greater equality of endowments tends to increase eﬀort for most and to make the
middle and upper “classes” worse oﬀ.
(ii) Greater equality of rewards tends to decrease eﬀort for most and make the lower
and middle “classes” better oﬀ.
Rank-Indexing: Fixed r
Endowments z more equal Rewards s more equal
Bottom Middle Upper Bottom Middle Upper
zp > za zp ∼ za zp < za sp > sa sp ∼ sa sp < sa
Direct Up > Ua Up ∼ Ua Up < Ua Up > Ua Up ∼ Ua Up < Ua
Total Up ≷ Ua Up < Ua Up < Ua Up > Ua Up > Ua Up ≷ Ua
Level-Indexing: Fixed z
Endowments z more equal Rewards s more equal
Bottom Middle Upper Bottom Middle Upper
rp < ra rp ∼ ra rp > ra sp > sa sp ∼ sa sp < sa
Direct Up < Ua Up ∼ Ua Up > Ua Up > Ua Up ∼ Ua Up < Ua
Total Up < Ua Up < Ua Up ≶ Ua Up > Ua Up > Ua Up ≷ Ua
Table 1: Summary of the eﬀects on individual equilibrium utility by individual’s starting
position in the distribution of endowments: direct vs. total eﬀect.
The summary of the eﬀects on equilibrium utility is presented in Table 1. Clearly,
there is some diﬀerence whether we index by rank or by level. However, it is also clear
that those in the middle of the human hierarchy will be happier with more equal rewards
than with more equal endowments whatever the means of comparison.
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7 Which Inequality?
In this paper, we focus mainly on two diﬀerent types of inequality - inequality of en-
dowments and inequality of rewards with our analysis done under the assumption of
(competitive) equality of opportunity. In the context of a simple model of social com-
petition, we are able to give formal, mathematical definitions of these three concepts.10
Approaching the issue of inequality from within economic theory, our terminology may
not easily map into the terminology widely used by moral philosophers. In this section,
we try to show how some aspects of the pre-existing concepts relate to our framework.
Our methodology is diﬀerent from the one typically used by those interested in dis-
tributional justice for a number of reasons. First, much research on inequality assumes
explicitly or implicitly that redistribution of resources can benefit some only at the
cost of others. Thus, it is purely a question of subjective judgement, formalized in
terms of a social welfare function, which of the many possible Pareto-eﬃcient distribu-
tions of resources is socially optimal. In contrast, in the presence of relative concerns
or inter-personal competition, the eﬀects of redistribution are not so straightforward.
Thus, second, we consider a world of imperfect competition and asymmetric informa-
tion, which necessarily we must analyze using game-theoretic methods.11 Thirdly, we
focus on how distributional changes aﬀect each individual’s welfare, rather than on
the welfare of the entire society. Finally, this work is descriptive in that we analyze
who loses and who gains from changes in equality, without any attempt to evaluate
normatively these gains and losses.
The possibility of spillovers from one individual’s choices to other individuals’ well-
being seemed to have attracted little attentions from moral philosophers. While Nozick
(1974) did briefly touch on this issue in his chapter “Equality, Envy, Exploitation, etc.”,
we are not aware of an existing theory of justice that allocates interpersonal competition
a central role. However, we do not deny the importance of moral judgement in this area.
Indeed, we hope that our work may provide a potential input into the work of moral
philosophers. Here we try to sketch briefly how we think our work relates to the existing
literature on distributive justice.
One of the early taxonomies of inequality is due to Rousseau (1754), who analyzed
two types of inequality - natural (“established by nature”) and moral (“established, or
at least authorised by the consent of men”).12 It is this second, moral, inequality, that
10Formal economic modelling of inequality is not new - see Roemer (1996) for an excellent account
of the formal economic approach to the theories of justice.
11Despite the enormous impact of such ideas on many areas of economics, strangely they seem to
have had little impact on the study of inequality.
12See Rousseau (1754, Part I): “I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among the human
species; one, which I call natural or physical, because it is established by nature, and consists in a
diﬀerence of age, health, bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind or of the soul: and another,
which may be called moral or political inequality, because it depends on a kind of convention, and is
established, or at least authorised by the consent of men. This latter consists of the diﬀerent privileges,
which some men enjoy to the prejudice of others; such as that of being more rich, more honored, more
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Rousseau criticized, thus establishing the long-running interest in inequalities created
or authorized by society. Our taxonomy of inequality diﬀers from the one established
by Rousseau as, in his treatment of “moral” inequality, Rousseau does not distinguish
between inequality of initial endowments and inequality of what one can obtain as
the result of social arrangements - i.e. of what we call rewards. Further, we consider
both “natural” endowments - such as abilities, talent, physical attractiveness, and so
on - as well as endowments that have economic, social, or “moral”, origin - such as
income, wealth, capital goods, and so on. However, we argue that whether endowments
are natural or socially created is still important in determining which of two diﬀerent
analytical methods, indexing by level and indexing by rank, is more appropriate. We
introduced the distinction between the two types of endowments in Section 3, and
went on to show in Sections 4 and 5 (where we consider, respectively, the “moral”
and “natural” sources of heterogeneity in endowments) that the two methods generate
diﬀerent perspectives on the eﬀects of changes in inequality.
In the past few decades the debate on “equality of what” has been re-ignited by
Sen (1980), who criticized the utilitarian approach, the total utility approach, and the
approach of Rawls (1971), pointing out that individuals may diﬀer in their ways of
utilizing endowments (their “technology”), or in their tastes.13 Here, we assume that
individuals diﬀer from each other in their endowments only, so that their tastes and
“technologies” they employ (that is, the way they transform their endowments into
performance) are the same. While these assumptions are undoubtedly restrictive, they
allow us to focus on the main question - that is, whether a particular individual’s welfare
is higher under inequality of endowments or under inequality of rewards. The “expensive
taste” argument, not dissimilar to the one presented by Sen (1980) was also put forward
by Dworkin (1981a) against pursuit of equality of welfare. Instead, Dworkin (1981b)
advocated for equality of resources. However, as in most of the existing literature on
distributive justice, Dworkin (1981b) does not seem to distinguish the timing or function
of diﬀerent economic resources, which is crucial to our distinction between endowments
and rewards.
The importance of inequality of rewards as incentive mechanism has been pointed
out by sociologists Davis and Moore (1945). In their functional theory of stratification,
they argued that a hierarchical system of rewards is necessary as it allocates talent
and provides motivation to exert eﬀort and/or acquire skills necessary for functionally
important or ability-demanding jobs. Similarly, Rawls (1971) accepted that inequal-
ity of rewards can be justified only as a motivational tool. Our results support the
motivational justification of inequality of rewards. Since more unequal rewards tend to
increase the return to eﬀort, eﬀort tends to increase when rewards are more unequal.We
also point out that while the inequality of rewards matters for incentives and thus in-
powerful or even in a position to exact obedience.”
13Sen (1980) put forward a radically diﬀerent idea, which is diﬃcult to capture with traditional
economic modelling tools. He advocated for equality of what he called “basic capabilities” - such
as abilities to move around, to meet nutritional requirements, to participate in the social life of the
community and so on.
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dividual welfare, so does the inequality of endowments. Moreover, as we show, for each
individual, the incentive eﬀects (and under some conditions, total eﬀects) of the two
types of inequality may be (qualitatively) the opposite of each other.
More recently, the attention of justice theorists has shifted towards equality of op-
portunity (see Rawls (1971) and Roemer (1996) among others). In practice, equal
opportunity is said to exist when people with similar abilities reach similar results
(equality of outcome). Importantly for our analysis is that equality of opportunity can
take various forms. One form is focused on the technologies available to the individuals.
For example, one can “level the playing field” and thus increase the rewards (or the
chances to receive a particular reward) of the disadvantaged by either providing them
with superior technology, or handicapping those better-endowed by making more diﬃ-
cult for them to exert eﬀort. Another form, advocated by Roemer (1996, 1998), focuses
on reward schedules, suggesting to equalize rewards to eﬀort across individuals holding
the same rank within the distribution of eﬀort within their own type.
Alternatively, equality of opportunity may be aﬀected through the rules accord-
ing to which distribution of rewards is made. That is, rewards can be allocated to
individuals not only on the basis of their performance (such as output or educational
achievements) but also based on other characteristics (such as initial endowment, socio-
economic status, gender, age, moral qualities, etc.). Lloyd Thomas (1977) pointed out
that it is important to distinguish the equality of opportunity when allocation involves
abundant rewards (e.g. everyone who wants to receive tertiary education will receive
some form of it) from the one involving scarce rewards (e.g. everyone who wants to get
a particular job will get it). He noted that improving some individuals’ opportunity
of receiving scarce rewards may involve “compulsory reducing the opportunities others
already have”. Instead, he advocated “fair competition for scarce resources” - an argu-
ment consistent with Nozick (1974)’s argument in support of fair rules. The argument
in support of competitive equality of opportunity was further advanced by Green (1989),
who argued that in the absence of perfect information about individual abilities, talents,
or endowments, society may often need to elicit these (or at least to be able to rank
individuals in the order of their endowments of productive resources), and competitions
are common mechanisms for information revelation.
Here, we imagine a society where there is formal equality of opportunity. That is,
“there is no legal bar to access to education, to all positions and jobs, and that all
hiring is meritocratic” (Roemer, 1996, p. 163) and where individuals are rewarded
according to their productivity (Lamont, 2003). We also assume that all individuals
use the same technologies (that is, no individual is handicapped and no individual
have an access to a superior technology). Further, the rewards to be distributed are
scarce and the individual endowment of productive resources is each individual’s private
information. Therefore, describing our tournament model as possessing competitive
equality of opportunity has some justification.
Thus, in summary, our current work diﬀers from prior work on distributive justice
for two main reasons. First, existing work has not considered the externalities arising
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from interpersonal competition and, therefore, has not taken a strategic approach to
understanding the impact of inequality. Second, while our tournament model borrows
the idea of equality of opportunity from the existing literature, to the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first attempt to separate inequality in terms of its timing and
function, between initial endowments and final rewards.
8 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper introduces a new distinction between diﬀerent kinds of inequality. Equality
of initial endowments and equality of the rewards to success in society have opposing
eﬀects. Greater equality of endowments increases the degree of social competition,
greater equality of rewards reduces it. Thus, it is not the case that greater inequality
necessarily decreases happiness. Rather, it is inequality of rewards, not of endowments,
that is a likely cause of concern.
There has been much recent work concerned with the possibility that people have
intrinsic preferences over the level of inequality. Here, we oﬀer a reason why inequality
may matter even without any concern for social justice and in the absence of such social
preferences. This is because when there is interpersonal competition for employment
and educational opportunities, inequality has a direct impact on incentives and, hence,
equilibrium eﬀort and equilibrium utility. The competitive threat of being excluded
from desirable opportunities means that, in equilibrium, everyone works too hard. This
means that people can be made better oﬀ by a change in incentives implicit in the two
diﬀerent forms of inequality. The majority can gain from a more dispersed distribution
of endowments or from a less dispersed distribution of rewards. In fact, we can con-
struct examples where a more equal distribution of rewards makes everyone better oﬀ,
that is, it is Pareto improving, even though this reduction in incentives decreases total
performance.
It is true that if competitors’ eﬀorts benefit other agents, such as partners, employ-
ers or members of future generations, then overall welfare judgements become more
complicated. However, our analysis does point up that there can be unexpected losses
from changes in the level of inequality. Gains to future generations may not be suﬃcient
compensation to those who lose now from greater inequality of rewards. Or, as another
possibility, societies with high inequality of rewards may have higher growth but lower
happiness for a given level of income than societies with greater equality of rewards.
Thus, one clear direction for further research is to use the current model as the stage
game in a dynamic setting. Preliminary results in this direction indicate that the ef-
fects of changes in inequality on growth depend heavily on whether current performance
determines the rewards or the endowments of the next generation.
As we demonstrated in this paper, the relationship between inequality and individual
welfare can be less straightforward than is commonly thought. The gains and losses
to greater equality are not uniform across society, and diﬀer according to whether we
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consider equality of endowments or of rewards. It even diﬀers according to the viewpoint
taken, that is, whether we compare at a constant level of endowment or at a constant
rank in society. However, rather than being a setback, we believe the richness of the
relationships we have outlined and the tools we have developed to analyze them oﬀer
many possibilities for greater understanding of social phenomena.
For example, one of the more recent reasons advanced for the desirability of greater
income equality is the presence of relative concerns. It has been argued that in countries
where gross poverty has been eliminated, health tends to be driven by stress caused by
one’s relative position, which, in turn, is exacerbated by inequalities. The most famous
single case study is that of British civil servants, where health was found to be very
strongly positively correlated with a civil servant’s rank in the service (Marmot et al.
(1991)). If this is the case, it has been argued by several authors, notably Frank (1999,
2000), that greater equality should be socially beneficial. However, we have seen in this
paper that, even if utility does depend on relative position, it may not be the case that
inequality has a negative impact on welfare. The fact that material outcomes depend on
interpersonal competition may in fact lead to utility increasing with greater inequality.
Indeed, the empirical evidence as a whole, surveyed in Deaton (2003), does not support
a general link between inequality and ill health. Equally, it has been diﬃcult to establish
whether there is a positive or negative relationship between inequality and self-reported
happiness or life-satisfaction (Alesina et al. (2004), Clark (2003)).
This paper suggests a reason why this may be the case. Even when utility depends
on relative position, diﬀerent types of inequality may have opposite eﬀects. Therefore,
empirical work that is based on measures of inequality that conflate rewards and endow-
ments may obtain weak results as the two opposing eﬀects may cancel. The problem in
immediately applying this insight to empirical problems is that, to our knowledge, no
distinction between reward and endowment inequality has traditionally been made in
data collection. However, with data sources such as longitudinal studies becoming more
widely available, it may soon be possible to distinguish between initial endowments and
final rewards.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the fact that this work approaches inequality
outside the framework of distributive justice does not mean that moral considerations
are irrelevant to the issue of inequality. In fact, precisely because existing theories of
justice do not give interpersonal competition such a central role, our tournament model
may provide new tools and new insights that may be useful to researchers on distributive
justice. Thus, we hope that this paper, even though it takes a purely economic approach
to the analysis of inequality, may aid the understanding of the non-economic aspects as
well.
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Appendix A: The Dispersive, Star and Other Sto-
chastic Orders
We use two diﬀerent stochastic orders, the dispersive and the star orders. These may not
be well known in economics (though see Hoppe et al. (2005)), but are extremely useful
for the social contests we consider. Let F andG be two arbitrary continuous distribution
functions each with support on an interval (but the two intervals need not be identical
or even overlap) and let F−1 and G−1 be the corresponding left-continuous inverses (so
that F−1(r) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1] and G−1(r) = inf{x : G(x) ≥ r}, r ∈ [0, 1]),
and let f and g be the respective densities.
Definition 1 (Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)) A variable with distribution F is said
to be smaller in the dispersive order (or less dispersed) than a variable with a distribution
G (denoted as F ≤d G) whenever G−1(r)−F−1(r) is (weakly) increasing for r ∈ (0, 1).
That is, the diﬀerence in the two variables at a given rank increases in rank. This
has the following important consequence,
G ≥d F if and only if f(F−1(r)) ≥ g(G−1(r)) for all r ∈ (0, 1) (18)
That is, for a fixed rank, the more dispersed distribution is less dense than the less
dispersed one. Note that because the condition (18) is expressed in terms of ranks,
there is no problem in comparing distributions with diﬀerent, even disjoint, supports.
Finally, when both distributions have finite means, if F is less dispersed than G then
VarF (z) ≤ VarG(z) whenever VarG(z) < ∞. Figure 7 shows a simple example of
distributions which are ordered in terms of the dispersion order. The distributions
G1B, G
2
B, G
3
B all have diﬀerent means but are equally dispersed and all are more dispersed
than GA. Figure 8 shows the importance of the dispersion order for incentives in the
tournament model: if a distribution Ha is more dispersed than a distribution Hp then
by (18) necessarily the inverse function Sa(r) is steeper than Sp(r). This is because if
S(r) = H−1(r), then S0(r) = 1/h(H−1(r)).
The star order is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, p105)). A variable with a distribution
G is larger than a variable with a distribution F , or G ≥∗ F , in the star order if
G−1(F (z))/z increases for z ≥ 0.
Note that if X and Y are two non-negative random variables then
X ≤∗ Y ⇐⇒ logX ≤d log Y (19)
But unfortunately if a distribution F is more dispersed than another distribution G, or
F ≥d G, it does not imply that F ≥∗ G, though it is not excluded. Nor does F ≥∗ G
imply F ≥d G, nor does it rule it out.
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Figure 7: An example of the dispersion order.
Lemma 1 Take two distributions Ha(s), Hp(s) with support on the positive real line
and with diﬀerentiable inverses Sa(r) and Sp(r) respectively. Then, the following holds
Hp(s) ≥∗ Ha(s)⇔
d
dr
Sp(r)
Sa(r)
≥ 0⇔
S0p(r)
Sp(r)
≥ S
0
a(r)
Sa(r)
(20)
for all r ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: The relationship between the first and second statements follows directly from
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994, pp70-71 and Theorem 3.C.1). The relation between
the second and third follows from diﬀerentiation.
Economists often use second order stochastic dominance to order distributions in
terms of dispersion, there is no clear relation between the dispersive order and second
order stochastic dominance. This is because, in everyday terms, one distribution can
second order stochastically dominates another if it is either higher or less dispersed,
while the dispersive order is only concerned with dispersion. Note also that ifHa ≥d Hp,
the distribution Ha is more dispersed but, for example, they have the same means, it
may well be true that distribution Hp second order stochastically dominates Ha. The
star order is much closer to second order stochastic dominance in that if distribution
Ha is larger in the star order Ha ≥∗ Hp than Hp, then it is larger in the Lorenz
order (Shaked and Shanthikumar, (1994, p107), which is equivalent to second order
stochastic dominance if the two distributions have the same mean.14 However, one
says that the less dispersed distribution second order stochastically dominates the more
dispersed, which is the other way round from the star and dispersive order where the if
a distribution is “larger” then typically it is more dispersed. See the following examples.
Example 2 If Ha(s) = s, that it is uniform on [0, 1] and Hp(s) = 2s−1/2, a uniform
distribution on [1/4, 3/4], then in many ways Ha is more dispersed than Hp. Indeed,
14Second order stochastic dominance is therefore sometimes referred to as the generalized Lorenz
order.
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Figure 8: Dispersion order: If the ex post distribution is less dispersed than the ex ante,
or Hp ≤ Ha then the inverse distribution function Sp = H−1p (r) is less steep than Sa for
all r ∈ (0, 1), i.e. the marginal return to an increase in rank is lower.
Sa(r)/Sp(r) = r/(r/2 + 1) which is increasing so Ha ≥∗ Hp. Furthermore, S0a(r) = 1 >
1/2 = S0p(r) so that Ha ≥d Hp. And finally Hp second order stochastically dominates
Ha.
This example illustrates a more substantive diﬀerence.
Example 3 If Ha(s) = s − 2, that it is uniform on [2,3] and Hp(s) = (s − 1)/2, a
uniform distribution on [1, 3], then Hp is more dispersed than Ha but stochastically
lower. The dispersive order captures the dispersion so as S0a(r) = 1 < 2 = S
0
p(r) so
that Hp ≥d Ha. But, Sp(r)/Sa(r) = (2r + 1)/(2 + r) which is increasing so Hp ≥∗
Ha. However, as Ha stochastically dominates Hp, it also second order stochastically
dominates Hp.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Mailath (1987) establishes in a general signaling model the
existence and uniqueness of a separating equilibrium under certain conditions. If the
current model fits within Mailath’s framework, then it would follow that the unique
separating equilibrium is a solution to the diﬀerential equation (5) with boundary con-
dition x(0) = xc(0) from Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath (1987, p1353). It would also
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follow by Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987, p1362) that x(z) > xc(z) on (z, z¯). The only
substantial diﬀerence is that Mailath assumes the signaller’s utility is of the form (in
current notation) V (r, rˆ, x) where V is a smooth utility function and rˆ is the perceived
type, so that in a separating equilibrium the signaler has utility V (r, r, x). To apply
this here, first, fix G(z) and H(s). Now, clearly, one can define the function V (·) such
that V (r, rˆ, x) = U(x,Z(r)−x, S(rˆ)) everywhere on [0, 1]× [0, 1]× [z, z¯]. One can then
verify that the conditions (i)-(v) imposed on U(·) imply conditions (1)-(5) of Mailath
(1987, p1352) on V .15 In particular, note that condition (1) is simply that V is twice
diﬀerentiable, condition (2) is that V2 6= 0, here V2 = UsS0(r) > 0. Condition (3) is
that V13 6= 0 and here V13 = (Uxy−Uyy)Z 0(r) > 0. Mailath’s condition (4) requires that
V3(r, r, x) = 0 has a unique solution in x which maximizes V (r, r, x). Here, V3 = Ux−Uy
and we have assumed under condition (v) that there is a unique solution to the equa-
tion Ux − Uy = 0. Since here V33 = Uxx − 2Uxy + Uyy < 0, this solution is a maximum.
Furthermore, since V33 is everywhere negative, Mailath’s condition (5) is automatically
satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 2: First note that, given the equation (5), we have that
x0a(r)
x0p(r)
=
φ(Za(r), S(r), xa)
φ(Zp(r), S(r), xp)
(21)
so that any point where xa = xp the relative slope only depends on Za and Zp, and thus
the slopes are equal whenever Za and Zp are equal. Furthermore, given our assumptions,
we have that
∂φ(z, s, x)
∂z
=
Uys(Uy − Ux)− Us(Uyy − Uxy)
(Uy − Ux)2
> 0 (22)
(by properties (iii) and (iv), it holds that Uy−Ux > 0 when evaluated at the equilibrium
solution as x(r) > xc(r)). Thus, at any point where xa(r) = xp(r) we have that x0a > x
0
p
(so that xa is steeper than xp and thus crosses xp from below) whenever Za(r) > Zp(r)
(i.e. whenever ex-ante endowments exceed ex-post endowments), and vice versa.
By the boundary conditions (7), the condition Za(0) ≤ Zp(0) implies that xp(0) ≥
xa(0) (i.e. that the poorest individual, now that she has greater endowments chooses
greater performance). Given our assumption that Ga and Gp are distinct it follows that
Zp(r) > Za(r) almost everywhere on (0, rˆ]. Thus, xp(r) can only cross xa(r) from below
except perhaps at the finite number of points where Zp(r) = Za(r).
We first rule out that that there is an interval where xp(r) ≤ xa(r). Suppose on the
contrary there exist at least one interval [r1, r2] ⊆ [0, rˆ] such that xp(r) ≤ xa(r). By the
continuity of xa and xp, it must be that xp(r1) = xa(r1). Note that
∂φ(z, s, x)
∂x
=
(Uxs − Uys)(Uy − Ux)− Us(2Uxy − Uxx − Uyy)
(Uy − Ux)2
< 0. (23)
15Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposition 5 (1987, p1364), also assumes that ∂V/∂rˆ
is bounded. Here, if we assume that both Us and S0(r) are bounded (the latter requires h(s) is non-zero
on its support), this result will also hold.
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In combination with (22), it would follow that x0a(r) < x
0
p(r) almost everywhere on
[r1, r2], which combined with xa(r1) = xp(r1) is a contradiction to xp(r) ≤ xa(r) on the
interval. Thus, xp(r) > xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, rˆ].
We next rule out that xp(r) = xa(r) at individual points. By the previous argument
that excludes intervals where xp(r) ≤ xa(r), this is only possible at the isolated points
where Zp(r) = Za(r). But at any such point r˜ on (0, rˆ], as Zp(r) > Za(r) almost
everywhere, we have that gp(Zp(r˜)) ≥ ga(Za(r˜)) (remember that Z 0(r) = 1/g(Z(r))).
Now, note that Zp(r˜) = Za(r˜) = z˜. Next, we invoke the level-indexing approach and
consider solutions to the game in terms of endowments z. Let S(z) = H−1(G(z)).
Write solutions to the diﬀerential equation (17) as xp(z) and xa(z) for the respective
distributions of endowments. Then if xp(r˜) = xa(r˜), it must be that xp(z˜) = xa(z˜).
As xp(r) > xa(r) for r in (r˜ − , r˜) for some  > 0, we must have xp(z) > xa(z) for
endowments slightly less than z˜. Note that it must hold that x0p(r˜) = x
0
a(r˜), and for the
case of gp(z˜) > ga(z˜), it must be that x0p(z˜) > x
0
a(z˜) so that xp(z) crosses xa(z) from
below, which is a contradiction. This leaves us with the possibility that xp(r) = xa(r)
in a non-generic case of gp(Zp(r˜)) = ga(Za(r˜)).
Proof of Proposition 3: First, as endowments are (weakly) higher at r = 0, the
privately optimal performance will be higher ex post xc,p(0) ≥ xc,a(0) as will equilibrium
performance at r = 0 by the boundary conditions (7). Thus, Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) (i.e. as the
poorest individual has no reduction in endowments she will not be worse oﬀ). We have
that
1
gp(Zp(r))
=
dZp(r)
dr
≥ dZa(r)
dr
=
1
ga(Z(r))
for all r ∈ [0, 1]
In other words, Zp(r) is (weakly) steeper than Za(r) on [0, 1], so that clearly Zp(r) ≥
Za(r) for r ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that Up(0) > Ua(0), and suppose, in contradiction to the claim we are
trying to prove, that Up(r) equals Ua(r) at least once on (0, 1). Denote the first such
point as r1 ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to show that, as Zp(0) ≥ Za(0) and Gp ≥d Ga, we have
Zp(r) > Za(r) for all r ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, by Corollary 1, xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, 1], and it
must be that yp(r) < ya(r) in the neighborhood of r1. Let Ui,y(r) = Uy(xi(r), Zi(r) −
xi(r), S(r)) for i = a, p. Then, as dUy = Uxydx + Uyydy, and, given our original
assumptions on U , it must be that Up,y(r) > Ua,y(r) in a neighborhood of r1. Using
the marginal utility condition (8), combined with the fact that, given the dispersion
order, g(Zp(r)) ≤ g(Za(r)) , it must be that U 0p(r) > U 0a(r) in a neighborhood of r1, so
that Up(r) can only be steeper than Ua(r), and thus can only cross from below. Given
Up(0) > Ua(0), we are done.
If instead we have that Up(0) = Ua(0), then, by the above argument which rules
out that Up can cross Ua from above, the claim can only fail if there is an interval
(0, r˜) on which Up(r) ≤ Ua(r). Then, there must exist a point r2 ∈ (0, r˜) such that
U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2) and Up,y ≤ Ua,y. But given (8) and that Gp ≥d Ga, if U 0p(r2) ≤ U 0a(r2)
then Up,y(r2) ≤ Ua,y(r2), which can only happen if yp(r2) ≥ ya(r2). But this, combined
with the fact that xp(r2) > xa(r2) (by Proposition 2) implies that Up(r2) > Ua(r2),
34
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4: From Proposition 2, we have xp(r) > xa(r) on (0, rˆ]. But
note as here Zp(0) > Za(0), the lowest agent has a strictly greater endowment, we
have also xp(0) > xa(0) as the cooperative choice, which is the equilibrium choice
of the bottom agent by (7), is increasing in endowments. Turning to utility, we can
consider two cases. First, suppose that xp(r) ≥ xa(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Then, as endowments for
individuals with rank (rˆ, 1] are strictly lower ex-post than ex-ante, we have necessarily
yp(r) < ya(r) on [rˆ, 1]. Now, as xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and yp(r) < ya(r), we then for some
r˜ can find a pair (x˜, y˜) such that x˜ + y˜ = xp + yp (that is, (x˜, y˜) are feasible given
ex-post endowments) but xc,p < x˜ < xp and y˜ = ya. But then, U(xp(r), yp(r), S(r)) <
U(x˜, y˜, S(r)) < U(xa(r), ya(r), S(r)), and the result follows.
Suppose now instead that xp(r) < xa(r) for some r in (r1, r2) with r1 > rˆ. If
yp(r) ≤ ya(r) on that interval, it is clear that Up(r) < Ua(r) and we are done. Suppose
instead that yp(r) > ya(r) on some interval (r3, r4) with r4 ≤ r2 (as endowments
are lower ex post for r > rˆ, it must be that r3 > r1). We want to rule out the
possibility of Up(r) ≥ Ua(r) somewhere on this interval. Now, it must be the case
that Up(r3) < Ua(r3) as xp(r3) < xa(r3) and yp(r3) = ya(r3). We have gp(r) ≥ ga(r)
everywhere. Furthermore, dUy = Uxydx+Uyydy. Given that x decreases and y increases
ex post on (r3, r4) and our original assumptions on U , it can be calculated that, given
(8), that U 0p(r) < U
0
a(r) on this interval. Combined with Up(r3) < Ua(r3), the result
follows.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, given the boundary condition (7), we have x(0) =
xc(0). Note that applying property (v) to the definition of xc(r) in (6), we have ∂xc/∂s ≤
0 so that given Sp(0) < Sa(0), it follows that xp(0) ≥ xa(0). Almost everywhere on
[0, rˆ), we have both Sa(r) > Sp(r) and S0p(r) > S
0
a(r). Note that
∂φ(z, s, x)
∂s
=
Uss(Uy − Ux)− Us(Uys − Uxs)
(Uy − Ux)2
≤ 0. (24)
It immediately follows that if xa(r) = xp(r) anywhere on [0, rˆ), x0a(r) > x
0
p(r). So, there
can only be one crossing of xa(r) and xp(r) on that interval and xp(r) must cut xa(r)
from below. Thus, the only way for the claim to be false is if xp(r) ≤ xa(r) on some
interval [0, r1]. But then, as ∂φ(z, s, x)/∂x < 0 by (23) and ∂φ(z, s, x)/∂s ≤ 0 by (24),
and as Sp(r) < Sa(r) and S0p(r) > S
0
a(r), it follows that x
0
p(r) > x
0
a(r) on [0, r1], which
is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6: Given additively separable utility, we have xp(0) = xa(0) =
xc(0) as with separable utility the cooperative choice does not depend on S(0). The
diﬀerential equation (5) is now
x0(r) =
S0(r)
Vy(x,Z(r)− x)− Vx(x,Z(r)− x)
(25)
Given the dispersion order, we have S0p(r) ≥ S0a(r) for all r and the result is easy to
establish using the arguments in the proof of the previous proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 7: As with additive separable utility, we have xp(0) = xa(0)
irrespective of Sa(0) or Sp(0). The diﬀerential equation is now
x0(r) =
S0(r)
S(r)
V (x,Z(r)− x)
Vy(x, Z(r)− x)− Vx(x, Z(r)− x)
.
Now, by Lemma 1 in Appendix A, by the star order we have S0p(r)/Sp(r) ≥ S0a(r)/Sa(r)
for all r. The proof again then follows that of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 8: Given the lowest reward S(0) is higher ex post, we have
Up(0) > Ua(0). We divide [0, 1] into two sets. Let I1 consist of points where xp(r) ≥
xa(r) and I2 consist of points where xp(r) < xa(r). Considering I2, as rewards are
higher and eﬀort lower, clearly Up(r) > Ua(r) on I2. Turning to I1, here xp(r) ≥ xa(r)
and hence yp(r) ≤ ya(r). Now, as U 0(r) = UyS(r)/g(Z(r)) and dUy = Uxydx + Uyydy,
we have U 0p(r) > U
0
a(r) almost everywhere on I1. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 9: We have Sa(r) < Sp(r) and S0p(r) < S0a(r) on [0, rˆ). Thus,
by reversing Proposition 5, we have xa(r) > xp(r) on (0, rˆ]. Furthermore, given that
rˆ is the first point of crossing, we have Sa(r) < Sp(r) on [0, rˆ). It is clear that, as
performance is strictly lower and rewards are higher under distribution Hp(s), it follows
that Up(r) > Ua(r).
Proof of Proposition 10: We have by the envelope theorem U 0(z) = Uy(x(z), z −
x(z), S(z)). First, we look at (i). Suppose the claim is false, and there exists at least
one interval on (z, zˆ] where Up(z) > Ua(z). Let us denote the set of points as IU =
{z ≤ zˆ : Up(z) > Ua(z)} (possibly disjoint), and let z1 = inf IU ≥ z. We can find a
z2 ∈ IU such that Up(z) > Ua(z) for all z in (z1, z2]. Note that since, by the common
boundary condition, Up(z) = Ua(z). As Gp(z) ≤ Ga(z), then Sp(z) ≤ Sa(z) for all
z ∈ IU . As rewards are lower, for Up(z) > Ua(z) to be possible, it must be the case that
xA(z) < xB(z) for all z ∈ IU . But then as U 0 is increasing in x(z) and strictly increasing
in S(z), we have U 0p(z) ≤ U 0a(z) on IU . This, together with Up(z1) = Ua(z1), implies
Up(z) ≤ Ua(z) for all z ∈ (z1, z2], which is a contradiction. Part (ii) can be established
by an identical argument
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